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Abstract
We study how customer base concentration at a target firm impacts the occurrence and structure
of M&A deals. We hypothesize that customer concentration increases information asymmetry and
adverse selection between bidders and targets, such that (1) firms with greater customer
concentration are less likely to receive a bid and (2) bidders for targets with greater customer
concentration share the risk by using more stock payment in their offer. Using data on customer
concentration and M&A deals from 1985 to 2016, we find consistent evidence supporting our
predictions. Our findings extend the literature by systematically documenting an important factor
in M&A decisions and by quantifying the economic consequences of customer concentration.
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1Customer Concentration of Targets in Mergers and Acquisitions
1. Introduction
Customer concentration captures how a firm’s revenue is distributed across its customers and
the extent to which the firm relies on a small set of large customers. It is one of the most
important firm characteristics of a firm’s customer base.1 Because of the importance of customer
concentration to the firm’s risk and opportunities, Accounting Standards Codification 280-10
(formerly SFAS No. 131) requires firms to disclose information about their reliance on major
customers which make up 10 percent or more of total firm sales. Customer concentration occurs
frequently and can be significant. Approximately 45 percent of public firms report at least one
major customer, and on average among manufacturing firms, one-third of sales is attributed to
major customers (Ellis, Fee, and Thomas 2012; Campello and Gao 2017). Anecdotal evidence in
M&A literature suggests that customer concentration of potential targets is a significant risk
factor for acquirers (Nead 2017; River’s Edge 2014). However, there is little empirical evidence
on how customer concentration of potential targets affects firms’ investment decisions. In this
study, we fill this void by systematically studying how target customer concentration impacts the
occurrence and structure of M&A deals.
Prior studies provide mixed views of the effects of customer concentration. On one hand,
customer concentration signals heightened business risk and has been shown to increase the cost
of equity and cost of debt (Kolay, Lemmon, and Tashjian 2016; Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and
Shaikh 2016; Campello and Gao 2017). On the other hand, some studies find that concentrated
firms have higher rates of return due to greater operating efficiencies (Kalwani and Narayandas
1 Forbes Magazine has noted that customer concentration risk is one of the biggest risks to business (Sutton and Nelson
2009).
21995; Patatoukas 2012). In the M&A setting, risk assessment of the target company is a key
consideration for the acquiring firm (Dunn, Fontenot, and Loew 2018; Kohers and Ang 2000).
Customer concentration increases uncertainty about a firm’s future cash flows because a major
customer may stop purchasing from the firm because of poor financial health or because of a
decision to switch suppliers. Also, the change of control associated with a merger may heighten
the risk of customers switching suppliers by disrupting customer-supplier relationships (Krug
and Hegarty 2001).2 This uncertainty creates the potential for information asymmetry between
the target and acquirer. Through interactions with major customers, the target acquires private
relationship-specific information that improves its ability to forecast cash flows relative to the
outside acquirer. This customer concentration-related asymmetry represents a risk to a potential
acquirer who may alter the terms of the offer (including declining to make an offer) to decrease
their exposure to this risk. With information asymmetry between the parties, the acquirer faces
an adverse selection problem and may decide not to make an offer. We therefore first
hypothesize that acquirers are less likely to make a bid offer for firms with greater customer
concentration because of the information asymmetry regarding this risk.3
When deciding to make an offer, the acquiring firm obtains private information and assesses
various aspects of target risks (Perry and Herd 2004). The information gathered via due diligence
may to some degree decrease information asymmetry but does not fully eliminate information
2 For example, Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh (2017) find that a change in a customer’s CEO disrupts the customer-
supplier relationship such that suppliers lose substantial sales following the change.
3 Our predictions are based on information asymmetry which arises through asymmetric uncertainty related to
customer concentration. For several reasons, uncertainty on its own does not necessarily lead to the same
predictions. First, if customer concentration-related uncertainty represents a risk that is apparent to both the target
and the acquirer, the risk can be priced and the deal can occur. Second, the direction of the effect of demand
uncertainty on an acquirer’s investment decision is theoretically ambiguous and depends on many assumptions,
including the risk attitudes of the acquirer, competition in product markets, and the anticipated costs of adjusting to a
demand shock. (Guiso and Parigi 1999).
3asymmetry or the uncertainty related to concentrated customers.4 Conditional on a bid being
offered, an acquiring firm has incentives to decrease its exposure to information asymmetry-
related risks. Hansen’s (1987) adverse selection model suggests that when a target firm knows its
value better than the acquirer does, the acquirer is more likely to pay with stock than cash, since
payment in stock allows future declines in target value to be shared between the target firm and
the acquirer. We therefore hypothesize that the proportion of payment offered in stock increases
with the concentration of the target’s customer base.
To test for the effects of target customer concentration on M&A deals, we gather data on
mergers and acquisitions over the years 1985 – 2016. We follow prior studies to define major
customers as those that account for at least 10 percent of a supplier firm’s total sales and measure
customer concentration in three ways: an indicator variable for having at least one major
customer, a sales-based Herfindahl Index, and the percentage of total sales attributable to major
customers (Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh 2016; Huang, Lobo, Wang, and Xie 2016).5 We
find that after controlling for other determinants of receiving a bid, potential target firms with a
more concentrated customer base are less likely to receive a bid. Specifically, a firm with at least
one customer that represents greater than ten percent of total sales has a 9 percent lower
likelihood of receiving a bid than those that do not. Firms in the top decile of customer
concentration have a 16 percent lower likelihood of receiving a bid than those in the bottom
4 In addition to analyzing documents like customer agreements and customer satisfaction scores or related data,
major customer due diligence can include conducting interviews and/or surveys of customers. We do not expect
such due diligence to fully eliminate information asymmetry for several reasons. First, some deals include non-
disclosure agreements that restrict the buyer’s ability to contact customers (Harroch 2015). Second, even if contact
does occur, major customers do not have incentives to disclose proprietary information about their supply chain
relationships to a third-party. Third, the subjectivity of the relationships themselves makes them difficult for a third-
party to ascertain or verify.
5 We use the 10 percent cut off because Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 131 requires disclosure
when sales to a customer account for 10 percent or more of the firm’s total sales. In robustness tests, we also use a
20 percent cutoff, and find qualitatively similar results.
4decile of customer concentration. Furthermore, we find in the sample that receives bids, the
proportion of payment offered in stock is higher when acquirers purchase targets with high
customer concentration. Specifically, the proportion offered in stock is 12 percent higher
(relative to the mean) for firms with at least one major customer. Stock-based payment is 22
percent higher for firms in the top decile of customer concentration compared to the bottom
decile.
We conduct cross-sectional tests to provide further support for the impact of customer
concentration on M&A outcomes. First, we examine whether the effects of customer
concentration differ when major customers are governmental or corporate. Compared to
corporate customers, government entities are less likely to default and more likely to negotiate
long-term contracts. These attributes of government entities decrease the uncertainty and
information asymmetry regarding future cash flows. Consequently, we find that the effects of
overall customer concentration on bid likelihood and payment method are driven mainly by
corporate customer concentration. In contrast, governmental major customers have no impact on
these M&A outcomes.
Second, we expect that when a target’s customers have low switching costs, the uncertainty
and information asymmetry about losing the cash flow from those major customers is higher.
Following prior studies, we measure switching costs using both the target firm’s market share
and the duration of the target’s major customer relationships (Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and
Shaikh 2016; Irvine, Park, and Yildizhan 2016). We find evidence consistent with this
prediction. When customers of potential target firms have low switching costs, the likelihood of
receiving a bid is even lower and the proportion of payment offered in stock is higher.
5Third, acquiring a firm with stock is a viable risk-sharing strategy only when the acquired
firm is sufficiently large relative to the bidder (Hansen 1987). Thus, we predict and find that the
method of payment effects become more pronounced when the size of the target increases
relative to that of the bidder. We find that the payment method effects are present only when
customer concentration represents a salient risk (i.e., low switching costs) and when the risk
sharing mechanism is available (i.e., the target is sufficiently large relative to the bidder).
Finally, we follow Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016) in performing instrumental
variable tests to alleviate the endogeneity concern that our results are driven by other target firm
characteristics that correlate with measures of customer concentration. In two-stage tests, we find
that predicted customer concentration remains negatively associated with bid likelihood and
positively associated with payment method in stock.
Our study contributes to two streams of literature. First, we extend the M&A literature by
systematically documenting another important risk factor in M&A decisions. Other risk factors
that have been shown to affect M&A deals include the target’s country of domicile, culture,
workforce stability, investment opportunities, etc. (Martin 1996; Bryson 2003; Cartwright and
McCarthy 2005; Huang et al. 2016). Prior studies also find that target-firm financial reporting
quality is significantly associated with various M&A outcomes (Skaife and Wangerin 2013;
Marquardt and Zur 2015). Our study extends this line of literature by documenting that target
customer concentration reflects an important uncertainty about the firm with implications for
information asymmetry and adverse selection. We extend prior M&A literature on how
information asymmetry affects the form of payment and the probability of receiving a bid
(Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Litov, and Neyland 2016; Faccio and Masulis 2005; Palepu 1986; Uysal
2011).
6Second, our findings extend prior studies that examine the economic consequences of
customer concentration. While several papers suggest that firms with a concentrated customer-
base can have higher profits because of improved efficiencies (Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995;
Patatoukas 2012), our findings suggest that the risk considerations manifest prominently in the
M&A market. Our paper relates to prior studies that document that customer concentration is
associated with higher cost of equity, cost of debt and crash risk (Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and
Shaikh; Campello and Gao 2017; Chen, Hu, Meng, and Yao 2018). Our findings quantify the
economic consequences of customer concentration in M&A markets and may be of interest to
practitioners who seek to understand how attributes of their customer bases impact their firms’
prospects in M&A markets.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and sample.
Section 4 presents empirical results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Prior Literature
Prior literature takes two views of customer concentration. A supplier’s relationships with
major customers, while conventionally viewed as impeding supplier performance, may in some
ways stimulate performance. The traditional ‘impediment’ viewpoint considers that major
customers may exercise their relative bargaining power to extract concessions from suppliers, in
the form of favorable trade terms including low prices (Galbraith 1952; River’s Edge 2014).
Major customers may also require significant relationship specific investments of their suppliers
(Titman and Wessels 1988). On the other hand, recent literature also proposes an efficiency
viewpoint. Suppliers with major customers may enjoy operating efficiencies that come with
7selling to major customers (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995) and may reap benefits by
coordinating supply chain logistics with major customers (Kinney and Wempe 2002). Patatoukas
(2012) investigates the net effect of customer concentration on suppliers’ performance and finds
some evidence of a causal link between customer concentration and higher accounting rates of
return. Irvine et al. (2016) extends Patatoukas (2012) by showing empirical evidence that the
effect of customer concentration on firm profitability depends on the life cycle of the
relationship.
SFAS No. 131 (Codification 280-10) requires firms to disclose major customers because they
signal high uncertainty about the supplier’s future cash flow, and because firm-specific shocks
along a supply chain can impact the performance of nearby firms in the chain (Hertzel, Li,
Officer, and Rodgers 2008; Kolay et al. 2016). Prior research studies how equity and credit
markets evaluate firms’ customer concentration. These studies estimate investors’ perceptions of
the net effect of all implications of customer concentration, including operating efficiency and
risk. Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016) document a positive association between
customer concentration and cost of equity, suggesting that on average, equity investors perceive
the risks associated with major customers as outweighing potential operating efficiencies.6
Campello and Gao (2017) find similar effects in bank lending: customer concentration increases
interest rates and the number of restrictive covenants while reducing maturities. Chen et al.
(2018) report a positive association between customer concentration and stock price crash risk.
They find that firms with high customer concentration are more likely to disclose bad news. In
6 Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016) also find a positive association between customer concentration and
bond yield spreads.
8summary, the literature provides not only evidence of customer concentration-related operational
efficiencies, but also evidence of customer concentration-related risk consequences.
In a relevant paper, Harford, Schonlau, and Stanfield (2018) examine whether direct and
indirect economic links between firms explain which firms are more likely to be involved in
mergers.7 While the tests of Harford et al. (2018) are designed to capture the M&A effects of
economic relationships in supply chains, we examine the effects of customer concentration per
se and how the information asymmetry and adverse selection problems that come with it
manifest in bid likelihood and deal structure.
2.2. Hypothesis Development
Practitioner literature consistently highlights target customer concentration as one of the most
important risk factors in M&A. An undiversified customer base is viewed by potential acquirers
as a significant risk for several major reasons. First, exposure to major customers brings potential
for extreme cash flow problems after the deal is done (Nead 2017). Not only might major
customers experience idiosyncratic shocks that disrupt liquidity at the potential target, but
acquirers also worry that a change in ownership increases the likelihood that major customers
defect entirely. Prior literature documents that many top managers depart shortly after an
acquisition (Krug and Hegarty 2001). To the extent that personal connections facilitate major
customer relationships, a change in control might lead to major customer turnover. Second,
powerful major customers such as Walmart and P&G often dictate terms of the supply
relationship, shrinking their suppliers’ margins, and delaying payments.8 Both of these factors
increase the uncertainty surrounding target firms’ future cash flows. Finally, even if the acquirer
7 Harford et al. (2018) find that firms with major customers are (1) more likely to receive bid offers from firms with
direct or indirect trade relationships and (2) less likely to receive bid offers from firms without any trade
relationship.
8 A Wall Street Journal Article “Small firms’ big customers are slow to pay” discusses these behaviors (Loten 2012).
9perceives a positive reward/risk tradeoff and is willing to pursue a deal with a potential target,
there is no guarantee that equity sources and debt sources of financing will agree to facilitate the
deal (River’s Edge 2014). Together these concerns make customer concentration a first-order
issue and potential deal-breaker as acquirers evaluate potential targets.
Prior literature shows that information asymmetry can influence acquisitions, including
valuations, acquirer returns, payment method, and bid likelihood (e.g., Eckbo, Giammarino, and
Heinkel 1990; Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller 2009; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999;
Officer 2004). Additionally, several papers show that the likelihood of being acquired increases
when mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry function. For example, auditor quality is
associated with a higher likelihood of a firm being acquired (Xie, Yi, and Zhang 2013) and firms
are more likely to receive a bid from a firm that has the same auditor (Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux,
Litov, and Neyland 2016). We believe that the uncertainty surrounding future major customer
cash flows introduces information asymmetry that is also likely to affect the likelihood of
receiving a bid.
Specifically, information asymmetry between the target firm and the acquiring firm causes
the acquirer to estimate a wider range of expected future cash flows than the target. The target
firm has a reservation price, which effectively creates a lower bound for a zone of possible
agreement between the target and acquirer (Fishman 1989; Sebenius 1992). Any offer made by
the acquirer must meet or exceed this threshold for a deal to occur. Information asymmetry may
lead the acquirer to price protect and potentially fail to make an offer price that meets the target’s
reservation price. This price protection is exacerbated in the case where a firm has concentrated
customers because the uncertainty of losing major customers increases the variance of future
cash flows and the potential for information asymmetry. Therefore, we expect that all else equal,
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price discounting will be greater in the concentrated customer case. Because deeper price
discounting decreases the likelihood that a bid will meet the target’s reservation price, we expect
that the likelihood of getting a bid will be lower.9
Furthermore, the empirical evidence of Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016) and
Campello and Gao (2017) suggests that debt and equity investors perceive customer
concentration as a net risk. This evidence, along with the arguments above and anecdotal
evidence suggesting that acquirers (and their sources of finance) carefully consider potential
targets’ customer concentration, leads us to hypothesize the following:
H1: The likelihood that a firm receives a bid decreases with the concentration of its
customer base.
We note that the operating efficiency view of customer concentration can possibly lead to the
opposite prediction. Specifically, if the acquirers weigh improved future profitability more than
risk considerations, then they may prefer target firms with concentrated customers. This
possibility adds tension to the hypothesis.
One important decision in structuring a merger or acquisition deal is the choice of exchange
medium. Payment to target stockholders can be made in cash, in securities, or some combination
thereof. Extensive prior literature examines the determinants of this choice, including tax and
corporate control considerations, leverage, growth opportunities, corporate governance concerns,
financing constraints, etc. (Amihud, Lev, and Travlos 1990; Carleton, Guilkey, Harris and
Stewart 1983; Martin 1996; Uysal 2011; Faccio and Masulis 2005). The risk perceived by the
acquirer also plays an active role in determining payment method. For example, Huang et al.
9 It is natural to expect that acquirers of targets with customer concentration may systematically offer lower price
premiums. However, the discounting may already be present in the stock price—that is, the stock price prior to the
bid offer. We therefore do not focus on examining the price premium in the M&A setting.
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(2016) find that acquirers are more likely to pay in stock when risk associated with cross-border
mergers increases. The increased use of stock under risky conditions is consistent with acquirers
sharing risk by using a payment method that is contingent upon the value created (Chi 1994).
Hansen (1987) models the transaction process of a merger or acquisition as a bargaining
game with imperfect information. An adverse selection problem arises because the target knows
its value better than the potential acquirer. This information asymmetry leads the acquirer to
prefer stock as payment instead of cash, because of the contingent pricing characteristics of a
stock payment. In other words, when the acquirer is less certain of the target’s value (i.e. its
future stream of cash flows), the acquirer is more likely to share the risk of acquiring the target
by paying with stock, making the value of the consideration paid to the target contingent on the
ongoing performance of target assets.
Because the uncertainty associated with customer concentration makes it harder for acquirers
to assess the future cash flows of the target and its value, the acquirer is likely to protect against
overpayment by paying with more stock relative to cash. Doing so effectively reduces the
acquirer’s exposure to risk because both acquirer and target share in the possible mispricing
(Hansen 1987; Huang et al. 2016). We hypothesize the following:
H2: The proportion of the bid offer comprised of stock payment increases with the
concentration of the target’s customer base.
3. Data and summary statistics
3.1. Sample selection
We begin by obtaining bids and deal characteristics from Securities Data Corporation’s
Mergers and Acquisitions Database (SDC) from the beginning of 1985 through the end of 2016.
We limit the sample to bids on public targets because we require stock returns and financial
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statement data for targets in our analysis. We also require that bidders own less than 50 percent
prior to making an offer and seek to own more than 50 percent after the deal is completed
(Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Litov, and Neyland 2016). These restrictions result in a base sample of
21,069 bids.
The unit of analysis for tests of our bid probability hypothesis is the firm-year. We obtain a
sample of Compustat firm-years from 1985 – 2016, which we augment with data on stock returns
from CRSP and institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters. We drop utilities (SIC 4900-
4999) and financial firms (SIC6000 – SIC6999) and require data to calculate the target firm
financial characteristics. These procedures yield a final sample of 108,430 firm-years, 8,448 of
which exhibit a bid received. We refer to this sample as the ‘bid sample’ and use it to test our bid
probability hypothesis.
The unit of analysis to test our payment method hypothesis is the bid offer. To craft a sample
for these tests, we begin with the full sample of 21,069 bids described above, supplemented with
the same set of financial characteristics of the target firm as well as additional deal-level data
from SDC, including the method of payment used in the deal (i.e., the percent paid with stock).
Requiring these data reduces the sample of bids available for payment method tests to 6,215. We
refer to this sample as the ‘payment method sample’. Some tests require a measure of the size of
the target relative to the acquirer. To accommodate these tests, we further restrict the sample of
bids by requiring that the bidder be a public firm so that we can include a measure of relative
size, along with other variables based on bidder financial characteristics. This requirement results
in a sample of 2,310 bids. This we call the “public acquirer sample”.
3.2. Measures of customer concentration
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We follow prior literature in using multiple measures of customer concentration.
Specifically, we capture the degree to which sales to a small set of customers of a target (or
potential target) firm is large relative to total sales (e.g., Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh
2016; Campello and Gao 2017; Patatoukas 2012). Beginning in 1976, accounting regulation
required public companies to disclose if they supply customers that account individually for 10
percent or more of the supplier’s revenue (ASC 280-10, FAS 131).10 We obtain customer
concentration data from Compustat’s segment customer files. Our first measure of customer
concentration is an indicator variable that is set to one if the target (or potential target) firm i
discloses a major customer in year t, and zero otherwise (MajorCustomerit). Our second measure
is based on an application of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated following Dhaliwal,
Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016).11 This index takes values between 0 and 1, where higher
values represent greater concentration of customers. We use the decile rank of the HHI index
(CustomerHHIit) as our second measure of customer concentration. We calculate our third
measure (TotalMajorCustomerSalesit) as the decile rank of the proportion of a target’s (or
potential target’s) total annual sales that is accounted for by its major customers.
3.3. Measures of bid probability and payment method
We measure bid activity by specifying the variable BidIndicatorit, which is equal to one if
firm i is announced as a target in a bid offer in year t, and zero otherwise. We measure payment
method by specifying the variable PercentStockk, which, for each deal k is equal to the portion of
10 Some supplier firms voluntarily disclose major customers that account for less than 10% of sales. Because this
voluntary choice could introduce self-selection bias, we do not include these customers in the various calculations of
customer concentration.
11 Specifically, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index captures target i’s customer concentration in year t across its n
major customers, as follows: = ∑ ( ) .
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the deal value offered in bidder common stock divided by total deal value. Bids and payment
method data are obtained from SDC, as described in Section 3.1.
3.4. Summary statistics
Table 1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the bid sample. The descriptive statistics
for our customer concentration measures are similar to prior studies.12 In 37 percent of our
observations, the target (or potential target) reports having at least one major customer.
CustomerHHI and TotalMajorCustomerSales (in their unranked form) average 0.06 and 0.16,
respectively. Among the set of observations with major customers, CustomerHHI and
TotalMajorCustomerSales average 0.16 and 0.43, respectively (untabulated). The average firm-
year in our sample exhibits growth, slightly positive abnormal returns, MTB of 2.68, and a PE
Ratio of 13.78. BidIndicator takes a mean value of 0.078, which is comparable to prior studies
(e.g., Cremers, Nair, and John 2008; Billett and Xue 2007). For detailed definitions of all
variables, see the appendix.
Table 1 Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the payment method sample. The
distributions of the customer concentration measures in this sample are similar to those in the bid
sample. On average, 27 percent of deal value is offered in stock of the bidding firm, while 60
percent is offered in cash, which is comparable to prior studies (e.g., Martynova and Renneboog
2009; Karampatsas, Petmezas, and Travlos 2014).13 Relative to the total sample of firm-years in
Panel A, firm-years with bids in Panel B tend to exhibit lower abnormal returns, MTB and PE
12 Other studies using these measures include Patatoukas (2012); Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling and Shaikh (2016); Huang
et al. (2016); Irvine et al. (2016); and Campbell and Gao (2017).
13 The remaining 13 percent of deal value is labeled by SDC as “other” (6 percent) and “unknown” (7 percent). Our
variable Percent_Stock is the proportion of total deal value that is categorized as stock. In untabulated robustness
tests, we define Percent_Stock as the proportion offered in stock scaled by the sum of the proportions offered in
stock and cash. Our main payment method results are not sensitive to this choice.
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Ratios. For nearly half (47 percent) of bids in our sample, bidders and targets are in the same
industry, and 13 percent of bids are contested, meaning multiple bids were received.
In Table 2, we report correlations among our measures of customer concentration, dependent
variables and controls. In the bid sample (Panel A), the different measures of customer
concentration are correlated with each other (Pearson correlations range from 0.51 to 0.83) and
each measure is negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a bid. In the payment
method sample, (Panel B), we observe no significant univariate correlation between customer
concentration measures and the percent offered in stock. We examine these relations more fully
in the following multivariate analysis.
4. Multivariate analysis
4.1. Customer concentration and bid probability
Our first tests address the relation between a firm’s customer concentration and its likelihood
of receiving a bid. We implement Logit regressions of the following general form:Pr( = 1) = + + + + + (1)
In this model, BidIndicatorit is equal to one for a firm-year if the firm received a bid as
reported by SDC (and zero otherwise), and CustomerConcentrationit is one of three measures
discussed in Section 3.2: MajorCustomer, CustomerHHI, or TotalMajorCustomerSales.
Customer concentration measures and financial control variables are calculated using the most
recent financial statement data disclosed prior to the bid announcement date. Xit is a set of
controls for additional determinants of the probability of receiving a bid, as implemented by
Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Litov, and Neyland (2016) and Palepu (1986). We include
AbnormalReturn and ROE to proxy for managerial effectiveness because acquisitions can be a
market mechanism to replace inefficient managers. Palepu (1986) also suggests that firms are
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likely targets when they exhibit mismatch between their growth and resources at their disposal.
The indicator GrowthMismatch is equal to one when a firm is low-growth but resource rich, and
when a firm is high-growth but resource poor.14 We also control for Growth, measured using a
three-year average change in sales. Because the costs associated with an acquisition increase
with the size of the target, we control for target Size using total assets. We include Liquidity and
Leverage to proxy for financial constraints of the target. MTB and PERatio proxy for the value of
the target. We also include InstitutionalOwnership to control for ownership of the target as a
determinant of bid likelihood. Finally, we include industry (βj) and year (βt) fixed effects to
control for variation in bids by industry and over time. See the appendix for specific variable
definitions.
Table 3 presents the results of this analysis. Columns 1-3 report the results of Logit
regressions of BidIndicator on each of the three customer concentration variables and controls.
To aid interpretation, we transform CustomerHHI and TotalMajorCustomerSales into decile-
ranked variables in all multivariate analyses.15 In each column, the coefficient on
CustomerConcentration is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01), suggesting a reliably
negative relation between a potential target’s customer concentration and its likelihood of
receiving a bid. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the information asymmetry
associated with a potential target’s customer concentration decrease the likelihood of receiving a
bid.
14 We follow Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Litov, and Neyland (2016) in calculating this variable. Specifically, Growth-
Mismatch equals one for firm-years that exhibit either (1) above-median leverage and growth, but below-median
liquidity, or (2) below-median leverage and growth, but above-median liquidity.
15 CustomerHHI and TotalMajorCustomerSales are ranked in deciles so that for each observation, these variables
take a value of an integer from 0 to 9.
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In un-tabulated analysis, we compute marginal effects to provide economic significance of
these results. The marginal effect of MajorCustomer (having at least one major customer) is
-0.0073. Relative to the sample mean of BidIndicator, this represents a 9.4 percent decrease in
the probability of receiving a bid. We compute the economic significance of CustomerHHI and
TotalMajorCustomerSales by comparing the bottom decile to the top decile. Relative to the
sample mean of BidIndicator, a shift from decile 1 to 10 represents a decrease in the probability
of receiving a bid of 17.9 percent and 16.6 percent, respectively.16
4.2. Customer concentration and method of payment
The negative relation between customer concentration and the likelihood of receiving a bid
suggests that bidders perceive potential targets’ customer concentration as a risk. We next
examine whether bidders seek to share the risk with the target by adjusting their method of
payment. By financing the deal with common stock, bidders can effectively apportion the
riskiness of the deal among the shareholders of the bidder and the target.17 To provide evidence
on whether bidders employ this risk-sharing mechanism, we examine the relation between our
measures of a target’s customer concentration and the proportion of the deal value the bidder
offers in common stock. We implement versions of the following general OLS regression:= + + + + + +
16 The marginal effect (un-tabulated) of CustomerHHI is -0.0016. Since CustomerHHI is decile-ranked, this is
multiplied by 9 to obtain the marginal effect of a shift from decile 1 to decile 10 (-0.0016 * 9 = -0.0140). We
compare this total marginal effect to the sample mean of BidIndicator to determine economic significance (-0.0140 /
0.078 = -0.179). The same methodology is used to calculated economic significance of TotalMajorCustomerSales.
17 Bidders can address the risk of mis-valuation using other contractual measures, including earnout clauses, which
defer a portion of the merger payment and make it contingent on the target meeting prespecified performance
standards.  However, earnout clauses are much more feasible and prevalent in acquisitions of private firms than
public firms, because negotiating a contract on ex post performance is much easier when there are one or a few
sellers (Kohers and Ang 2000). In our sample of 6,215 bids for public targets, we observe only 27 with earnout




In this model, PercentStockitk is the portion of the value of deal k offered using bidder
common stock. CustomerConcentrationit for target firm i is measured as of the fiscal year-end (t)
immediately preceding the announcement of deal k using one of the three measures described
previously. Xit and Xk represent target-level and deal-level control variables, respectively. Since
the factors driving the decision to place a bid may also affect the terms of the bid, we include in
Equation (2) each of the control variables from Equation (1). We augment these controls with
additional variables that have been shown to affect the method of payment in acquisitions,
following the payment method model of Uysal (2011). Specifically, we include ReturnVolatility,
SameIndustry, and CompetedBid.18 Finally, we include industry (βj) and year (βt) fixed effects.
Table 4, Panel A presents the results of OLS regressions of PercentStock on target customer
concentration measures. When using the sample of 6,215 bids obtained as described in Section
3.1, we observe positive and significant coefficients on all three measures of target customer
concentration (p < 0.01). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the information
asymmetry and mis-valuation risk associated with a target’s customer concentration lead
acquirers to prefer stock payment. In terms of economic significance, the proportion of the deal
paid in stock is 3.2 percentage points higher when the target has at least one major customer.
This represents an increase of 12.2 percent relative to the sample mean of PercentStock. In
column two, the coefficient on CustomerHHI is 0.617, representing the average effect on
payment method of a one-decile increase in CustomerHHI. A shift from decile 1 to 10 of
CustomerHHI represents an increase of 20.9 percent relative to the sample mean of PercentStock
(the corresponding estimate for TotalMajorCustomerSales is 22.6 percent).
18 In the smaller sample of bids (in Table 4, Panel B) from public bidders we also include AcquirerSales,
AcquirerROA, AcquirerMTB, and RelativeSize.
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Notwithstanding the on-average results in Table 4, Panel A, we expect the relation between
target customer concentration and the proportion of the deal paid in stock to vary based on the
size of the target relative to the size of the acquirer. For the value of stock consideration to be
contingent on the performance of the combined firm (and thus for stock payments to function as
a viable risk-sharing mechanism), the assets and operations acquired must amount to a
significant portion of the new, combined firm. As such, we expect the overall effect of customer
concentration in Panel A of Table 4 to be stronger when the relative size of the target is greater.
To test this expectation, we supplement Equation (2) with RelativeSize and its interaction with
CustomerConcentration.19 Since the calculation of RelativeSize requires assets of the bidder, the
sample for these tests is restricted to 2,310 deals with public bidders for which we have financial
data. In these tests, we also control for additional bidder characteristics, following Uysal (2011).
Relative size results are reported in Panel B of Table 4. The main effect of customer
concentration (i.e., when RelativeSize = 0) is insignificant in all three tests, suggesting that when
targets are very small relative to bidders, customer concentration shares no relation with the
method of payment. Coefficients on RelativeSize are positive and significant in each column,
consistent with the size of the target impacting payment method when customer concentration is
negligible. The interactions between RelativeSize and CustomerConcentration measures are all
positive and significant (p < 0.05), which is consistent with bidders using payment in stock as a
mechanism to share customer concentration-related risk when the option is viable (i.e., when
targets are sufficiently large). CustomerConcentration has a much greater economic impact on
the percent paid in stock when interacted with RelativeSize. In column 1, the total effect of
19 RelativeSize is calculated as the ratio of target assets to bidder assets, then ranked in deciles and scaled to range
from 0 to 1.
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CustomerConcentration is 7.582, which represents a 28.6 percent increase relative to the sample
mean of PercentStock. In columns 2 and 3, a shift from decile 1 to 10 of CustomerHHI
represents an increase of 51.7 percent relative to the sample mean of PercentStock (the
corresponding estimate for TotalMajorCustomerSales is 55.9 percent).
4.3. Cross-sectional tests
In this section, we report the results of cross-sectional tests showing variation in the relation
between (potential) targets’ customer concentration and bid outcomes. Specifically, we examine
whether the main relations we document in Table 3 and Table 4 are stronger when customer
concentration results in greater uncertainty and information asymmetry. We do this in two sets of
tests. First, we identify the major customers of targets in our sample as government and non-
government entities so that we examine the two components of customer concentration
separately (e.g., Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh 2016). Second, we examine the effect of
target customer concentration given variation in the major customers’ switching costs. We proxy
for switching costs using the target firm’s market share (e.g., Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and
Shaikh 2016) and the length of major customer relationships (e.g., Irvine et al. 2016).
4.3.1. Governmental and non-governmental concentration
The concentration of a firm’s customer base is important in assessing the risks inherent in the
target firm’s future cash flows, affecting uncertainty and thus the information asymmetry
between a bidder and target. We expect this concentration-related uncertainty and information
asymmetry to vary with the stability and predictability of cash flows from major customers. Our
first cross-sectional tests consider the possibility that governmental major customers represent a
more stable stream of cash flows than do non-governmental major customers. Government
entities are less prone to financial distress that disrupts their purchasing and often deal in long-
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term contracts which provide assurance around near-term cash flows. Furthermore, the
bureaucracy of government entities makes them less likely to switch suppliers. For these reasons,
we expect less uncertainty and information asymmetry vis-à-vis a target’s customer
concentration if the target’s major customers are government entities. To test this question, we
estimate bid probability and payment method models replacing the overall customer
concentration measures with its components: Govt_Concentration and
NonGovt_Concentration.20
The results in Panel A of Table 5 show that the negative on-average relation between
customer concentration and bid probability documented previously is concentrated among
potential targets with non-government concentration (p < 0.01). In contrast, each of the
coefficients on Govt_Concentration is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In each column,
the coefficient on NonGovt_Concentration is significantly more negative than the coefficient on
Govt_Concentration (p < 0.10).
A similar story emerges in the payment method tests reported in Panel B of Table 5. The
positive relation between customer concentration and the proportion of bid offers consisting of
stock payment is concentrated among bids for targets with non-government concentration (p <
0.01). In contrast, each of the coefficients on Govt_Concentration is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The results of t-tests comparing the coefficients on
NonGovt_Concentration and Govt_Concentration indicate that NonGovt_Concentration has a
20 Customers are identified as government entities if Compustat categorizes them as such (i.e., if customer type
equals GOVDOM, GOVFRN, GOVLOC, or GOVSTATE). We also consider observations with customer type equal
to “COMPANY” but whose names contain one or more of the following key words: Army, Govts, Govt,
Government, Governments, Federal, Defense, Department, Dept, Medicaid, Medicare, United States, and US. We
manually verify that sixty-five of these organizations are fully-owned by governmental entities and identify them as
such in our analysis.
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significantly greater impact on payment method than Govt_Concentration (at marginal statistical
significance (p = 0.11)).
As discussed in Section 4.2, the size of the target relative to the bidder determines the degree
to which stock payment is a significant risk sharing mechanism. To further examine the effects
of government and non-government customer concentration on payment method, we interact
Govt_Concentration and NonGovt_Concentration with RelativeSize (using the public acquirer
sample of 2,310 bids). As reported in Panel C of Table 5, we observe much stronger effects when
relative size is high. Specifically, when RelativeSize = 1 (i.e., in the top decile), the total effect of
NonGovt_Concentration on payment method is significantly greater than the total effect of
Govt_Concentration (p < 0.05).
We interpret the results of Table 5 as evidence that the overall negative (positive) relation
between customer concentration and bid likelihood (payment method) is driven exclusively by
corporate, non-governmental major customers. The reduced uncertainty and information
asymmetry surrounding future cash flows of major government customers appear to minimize
bidders’ concerns.
4.3.2. Switching costs using target market share
Our second set of cross-sectional tests examine the implications of the barriers that major
customers face to switching suppliers. When costs to a customer of switching suppliers are
lower, the likelihood that the customer will switch is higher. This higher customer switch risk
makes cash flows from major customers less reliable. We expect bidders to consider switching
costs of major customers when evaluating the uncertainty associated with targets’ customer
concentration. Specifically, when switching costs are low, we expect a stronger negative
(positive) relation between customer concentration and bid likelihood (payment with stock).
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To test these predictions, we first follow Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016) in
capturing customer switching costs by using supplier sales to measure industry market share.21
We measure SwitchingCosts as the fraction of the supplier’s total industry sales that is captured
by the supplier. Higher market shares (higher values of SwitchingCosts) indicate situations when
customers face more difficulty in switching suppliers. We supplement Equations (1) and (2) with
the SwitchingCosts variable and its interaction with CustomerConcentration and report results in
Panels A and B of Table 6.
Results in Panel A of Table 6 show that switching costs play a significant role in our bid
probability setting. The interaction of CustomerConcentration and SwitchingCosts (ν3) is
positive and significant in each model (p < 0.01). This finding suggests that when potential
targets have captive major customers, the uncertainty and information asymmetry vis-à-vis the
associated cash flows is low, which attracts bidders. On the other hand, when switching costs are
low, customer concentration exhibits a strong negative relation with BidIndicator. Furthermore,
the sum of coefficients on customer concentration and the interaction (i.e., the total effect of
customer concentration, or ν1 + ν3) is consistently positive and significant (p < 0.01). This result
suggests that when uncertainty and information asymmetry surrounding cash flows from major
customers attenuate (when the major customers are highly unlikely to switch suppliers), the
stability of major customer cash flows makes firms attractive targets.
We report switching cost analyses in our payment method setting in Table 6, Panel B. When
switching costs are low we observe a strong positive relation between customer concentration
and stock-based payment (i.e., a positive main effect of CustomerConcentration [δ1], p < 0.01).
21 We use market share as a proxy for switching costs on the intuition that when a supplier has low industry market
share, more alternative suppliers are available to its customers.
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However, inconsistent with our prediction, both the interaction of CustomerConcentration and
SwitchingCosts (δ3) and the total effect of CustomerConcentration when switching costs are high
(δ1 + δ3) are insignificant. Given the importance of the target’s relative size in determining
payment method, we next augment the model with RelativeSize and its two- and three-way
interactions with CustomerConcentration and SwitchingCosts (using the public acquirer sample
of 2,310 bids). As reported in Panel C of Table 6, we observe that conditional on relative size
being high, the relation between CustomerConcentration and PercentStock is positive when
switching costs are low (e.g., the total effect of MajorCustomer when relative size is in the top
decile but switching costs is in the bottom decile [τ1 + τ4] is 17.842, p < 0.01) and negative and
insignificant when switching costs are high (e.g., the total effect of MajorCustomer when relative
size is in the top decile and switching costs is also in the top decile [τ1 + τ4 + τ5 + τ7] is -3.301, p
= 0.65). Furthermore, when relative size is high, the difference between the effects of customer
concentration under high and low switching costs is statistically significant (e.g., in column 1, [τ5
+ τ7] = -21.143, p < 0.10).
In summary, our target market share analyses yield evidence that the negative relation
between target customer concentration and bid probability is strengthened when the targets’
customers face low barriers to switching suppliers. Also, the positive relation between target
customer concentration and the proportion of payment made in stock is concentrated in the
sample where switching costs are low and relative size is high.
4.3.3. Switching costs using relationship age
Irvine et al. (2016) argue that the effects of customer concentration vary with the maturity of
major customer relationships, reporting evidence that the relation between customer
concentration and profitability is negative in the early years of the relationship but positive in
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later years. In related literature, supplier-customer relationship age is also used as a proxy for
relationship specific investment (RSI) and switching costs (e.g., Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim
2007; Brown, Fee, and Thomas 2009; Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh 2017). Customers and
suppliers in long-term relationships are more likely to have made investments specific to the
relationship, which increases the costs to the customer of switching to a new supplier.
If switching costs indeed increase with the maturity of major customer relationships, we
expect the likelihood of receiving a bid to vary negatively with target customer concentration in
the early years of the relationship and less negatively as the relationship matures.22 To test this
prediction, we estimate the bid probability method models replacing the overall customer
concentration measures with its components: CustomerConcentration_Long and
CustomerConcentration_Short.23
The results in Panel A of Table 7 show that the negative on-average relation between
customer concentration and bid probability documented previously is concentrated among
potential targets with short major customer relationships (p < 0.05). In contrast, each of the
coefficients on CustomerConcentration_Long is significantly positive (p < 0.10). In each
column, the coefficient on CustomerConcentration_Short is significantly more negative than the
22 Relationship age may also proxy for the degree of information asymmetry between bidder and target that derives
from major customer relationships. In the early years of a supply relationship, the public (and any potential acquirer)
has very little information regarding the longevity of the major customer relationship, while the target’s information
set includes private communications and agreements with the major customer as to the RSIs undertaken by each
party. As the relationship matures however, RSIs are incurred and the likelihood that the relationship fails decreases.
The public infers relatively more information regarding the future stability of the relationship from its historical
stability. This improvement in public inference reduces the information asymmetry between bidder and target
(which results in the same prediction for our tests as the switching costs approach).
23 To calculate CustomerConcentration_Long and CustomerConcentration_Short we measure the number of
consecutive years that the target has disclosed a relationship with each major customer. Customers that have had a
relationship for an above median number of consecutive years are used to calculate CustomerHHI_Long,
MajorCustomer_Long, and TotalMajorCustomerSales_Long, else they are used to calculate CustomerHHI_Short,
MajorCustomer_Short, and TotalMajorCustomerSales_Short.
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coefficient on CustomerConcentration_Long (p < 0.01). This pattern of results suggests that
when major customer relationships are new, firms are less likely to receive a bid, but as those
relationships mature, the negative association between customer concentration and bid likelihood
attenuates. When major customer relationships are mature and customer concentration is high,
the uncertainty and information asymmetry surrounding major customer cash flows is low and
the stability of these significant cash flows makes firms attractive as targets.
A similar pattern emerges in the payment method tests reported in Panel B of Table 7. The
positive relation between customer concentration and payment in stock is concentrated among
bids for targets with short major customer relationships (p < 0.01). In contrast, each of the
coefficients on CustomerConcentration_Long is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The
results of t-tests comparing the coefficients on CustomerConcentration_Short and
CustomerConcentration_Long indicate that directionally, short major customer relationships
have a greater impact on payment method than mature major customer relationships (albeit only
statistically significant under one-tailed tests in column 1).24
4.4. Instrumental variables regressions
In this section we address the possibility that unobserved omitted variables drive the relations
we observe. For example, targets with high customer concentration may tend to also exhibit
other business risks which themselves could drive some of our results. We address this concern
by controlling for endogeneity in an instrumental variables framework, instrumenting for
customer concentration using two- and three-year lagged industry averages of customer
24 In untabulated analyses we augment the model with RelativeSize and its two- and three-way interactions with
CustomerConcentration and SwitchingCosts. In this triple-interaction model, the difference between the total effects
of long and short customer concentration is statistically insignificant.
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concentration.25 In utilizing these instrumental variables, we apply the intuition of Dhaliwal,
Judd, Serfling and Shaikh (2016), who argue that, in their setting, the lagged industry averages of
customer concentration satisfy both the relevance condition and exclusion restriction required of
valid instruments.  Analogously, in our M&A models, validity of these instruments hinges on (1)
their relevance to the customer concentration variables and (2) their correlation with bid
probability and payment method only through the customer concentration variables (i.e., not
correlated with the error terms).
By capturing the structure of customers by industry, average industry customer concentration
should be highly correlated with an individual target’s customer concentration, satisfying the
relevance condition. Furthermore, lagged industry customer concentration is unlikely to be
correlated with current bid probability and payment method (except through an individual
target’s customer concentration) because acquirers value potential targets and structure their bid
offers based on estimates of future cash flows. Thus, lagged industry values likely satisfy the
exclusion restriction.
Panel A of Table 8 presents the first-stage of the instrumental variables approach in our bid
likelihood tests. Specifically, we report results of regressing each of our customer concentration
variables on its two- and three-year lagged industry averages, including the controls from Table
3. We conduct several tests of the validity of our instruments. Low p-values in the Hausman
specification tests (p < 0.01) reject the null that the customer concentration variables are
exogenous on their own. High partial R2s and F-statistics indicate the strength of our instruments
(relevance to customer concentration). High p-values in the Sargan-Hansen tests (p > 0.23)
25 We follow Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016) in using lagged industry averages of customer
concentration as instrumental variables and in calculating industry averages using 3-digit SIC. The target’s customer
concentration is excluded from the calculation.
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indicate that we are unable to reject the null that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term (exclusion restriction). Results of the second stage regressions, presented in Panel B of
Table 8, indicate a strong negative relation between predicted customer concentration and the
likelihood of receiving a bid.
Panel A Table 9 presents the first-stage regressions of the instrumental variables approach in
our payment method tests. We again observe high partial R2s and F-statistics, along with
insignificance in the Sargan-Hansen tests. These results bolster the validity of our instruments. In
the Wu-Hausman tests, we observe p-values marginally higher than 0.10 (but less than 0.22) and
cannot reject the null that customer concentration variables are exogenous to begin with.
However, to address remaining concerns that our results are driven by endogeneity we proceed
with second-stage analysis. The results, presented in Panel B, indicate a strong positive relation
between predicted customer concentration and the proportion of the deal paid for using stock.
In summary, to the extent that our instrumental variables satisfy the validity requirements, we
interpret our results as evidence of a causal negative (positive) relation between target customer
concentration and the probability of receiving a bid (the proportion of the deal offered in acquirer
common stock).
5. Conclusion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in M&A markets, acquirers carefully consider the customer
concentration of potential target firms, counting information related to customer concentration as
“crucial and telling” (e.g., Wagner 2017). Acquiring a target with major customers can
potentially bring operating efficiencies and significant cash flows, but such a target also comes
with significant uncertainty, as major customers may elect to switch suppliers or experience
distress that disrupts their buying behavior. This uncertainty introduces information asymmetry
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between the acquirer and target, because the target amasses private information through its
relationships with major customers. Consistent with this asymmetry, we report evidence that
firms with greater customer concentration are less likely to receive a bid, and that conditional on
making a bid offer, bidders for targets with greater customer concentration share the risk by
paying more with stock (so that the value of the offer is contingent on the long-run success of the
deal). Our findings are robust to endogeneity tests using instrumental variables.
We also find that our results vary in cross-sections of firms for which customer concentration
results in more or less uncertainty and asymmetry. First, the negative (positive) relation between
target customer concentration and bid likelihood (proportion paid in stock) only exists for
corporate major customers – relatively more stable government customers have no impact on
these M&A outcomes. Second, the effect of customer concentration on payment method is
stronger when the target is sufficiently large relative to the acquirer, making stock payment
viable as a risk-sharing mechanism. Third, the bid likelihood and payment method results are
even stronger when the target’s customers have low costs of switching suppliers. By quantifying
the economic consequences of customer concentration, our findings provide useful insights to
practitioners who seek to understand how attributes of their customer bases impact their firms’
prospects in M&A markets.
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CustomerConcentration = one of CustomerHHI, MajorCustomer, and TotalMajorCustomerSales, defined as follows:
CustomerHHI = the squared sum of the ratio of major customer sales to total sales. Summed across all major
customers within a firm and decile ranked.
MajorCustomer = one if the firm has a major customer; zero otherwise.
TotalMajorCustomerSales = the sum of all sales to major customers divided by total sales, decile ranked.
Govt_Concentration = one of CustomerHHI, MajorCustomer, and TotalMajorCustomerSales, defined as above, except that only
governmental customers are included in the calculation.
NonGovt_Concentration = one of CustomerHHI, MajorCustomer, and TotalMajorCustomerSales, defined as above, except that only
non-governmental customers are included in the calculation.
CustomerConcentration_Long = one of CustomerHHI, MajorCustomer, and TotalMajorCustomerSales, defined as above, except that only
customers that have had a disclosed relationship with the firm for an above median number of
consecutive years are included in the calculation.
CustomerConcentration_Short = one of CustomerHHI, MajorCustomer, and TotalMajorCustomerSales, defined as above, except that only
customers that have had a disclosed relationship with the firm for a below median number of consecutive
years are included in the calculation.
Dependent Variables
BidIndicator = one for a firm-year if the firm received a bid prior to the disclosure of the subsequent 10-K; zero
otherwise.
PercentStock = the percent of payment that was offered in stock.
Control Variables
AbnormalReturn = market adjusted monthly returns cumulated over the twelve months prior to year-end.
AcquirerMTB = acquirer market value of equity divided by acquirer book equity.
AcquirerROA = acquirer net income divided by acquirer assets.
AcquirerSales = acquirer sales in billions.
CompetedBid = one if SDC identifies the bid as a challenged bid; zero otherwise.
Growth = the average percent change in sales over the previous three years.
GrowthMismatch = one if there is a growth-resource mismatch, zero otherwise. There is a growth-resource mismatch if a firm
has high leverage, low liquidity, and high growth or low leverage, high liquidity, and low growth. Low
and high indicate below and above median, respectively. (Dhaliwal et al., 2016)
InstitutionalOwnership = the percent of shares held by institutional investors.
Leverage = total long-term debt divided by common equity.
Liquidity = net liquid assets divided by book assets averaged between periods t through t-3. Net liquid assets equals
(cash + marketable securities - current liabilities).
MTB = market value of equity divided by book equity.
PERatio = share price divided by earnings per share.
RelativeSize = target assets divided by acquirer assets, decile ranked and scaled to between zero and one.
ROE = net income divided by total stockholder’s equity.
ReturnVolatility = the standard deviation of daily returns over the twelve months ending five days prior to the bid
announcement date.
SameIndustry = one if the target and acquirer have the same two-digit SIC code; zero otherwise.
Size = total assets in billions
SwitchingCosts = Industry market share, decile ranked and scaled to between zero and one. Industry market share is total









percentPanel A: The bid sample (N = 108,430)
Customer Concentration Measures
CustomerHHI 0.060 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.045
MajorCustomer 0.372 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
TotalMajorCustomerSales 0.160 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.250
Dependent Variable and Controls
BidIndicator 0.078 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.000
AbnormalReturn 0.024 0.550 -0.272 0.006 0.283
Growth 0.669 26.486 0.014 0.100 0.239
GrowthMismatch 0.307 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000
InstitutionalOwnership 0.222 0.318 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leverage 0.596 1.814 0.001 0.220 0.715
Liquidity 0.121 0.223 -0.008 0.059 0.218
MTB 2.677 4.217 1.053 1.791 3.148
PERatio 13.740 52.612 -2.082 12.166 21.517
ROE -0.048 0.822 -0.056 0.077 0.152
Size 3.580 20.999 0.051 0.236 1.165
SwitchingCosts 0.012 0.044 0.000 0.001 0.005
Panel B: The payment method sample (N = 6,215)
Customer Concentration Measures
CustomerHHI 0.057 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.040
MajorCustomer 0.360 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000
TotalMajorCustomerSales 0.153 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.226
Dependent Variable and Controls
PercentStock 26.546 41.105 0.000 0.000 60.010
AbnormalReturn -0.031 0.531 -0.312 -0.034 0.242
CompetedBid 0.131 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.000
Growth 0.299 1.883 0.015 0.100 0.237
GrowthMismatch 0.322 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000
InstitutionalOwnership 0.196 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.336
Leverage 0.128 0.222 -0.006 0.058 0.229
Liquidity 0.678 1.894 0.001 0.222 0.809
MTB 2.350 3.572 1.019 1.625 2.668
PERatio 11.980 53.602 -2.225 11.298 20.576
ROE -0.063 0.794 -0.063 0.069 0.138
ReturnVolatility 0.039 0.025 0.023 0.032 0.047
SameIndustry 0.470 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000
Size 1.215 4.214 0.063 0.196 0.728
SwitchingCosts 0.006 0.025 0.000 0.001 0.003
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in our analyses. Panel A includes the variables and sample used
for bid probability tests. Panel B includes the variables and sample used for payment method tests. See the appendix for all
variable definitions. CustomerHHI and TotalMajorCustomerSales, while decile-ranked in all further analyses, are presented




Panel A: The bid sample (N = 108,430)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1 CustomerHHI 1.00 0.51 0.83 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.12 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
2 MajorCustomer 0.97 1.00 0.79 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06
3 TotalMajorCustomerSales 1.00 0.97 1.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.13 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06
4 BidIndicator -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
5 AbnormalReturn -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00
6 Growth 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.03 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 GrowthMismatch 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 1.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
8 InstitutionalOwnership 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.01 -0.02 1.00 -0.01 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.09
9 Leverage -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 1.00 -0.15 0.43 -0.01 -0.18 0.04 0.05
10 Liquidity 0.09 0.07 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.14 -0.42 1.00 0.15 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10
11 MTB -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.32 0.23 -0.07 0.15 0.11 0.22 1.00 0.03 -0.20 0.00 0.03
12 PERatio -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 0.19 0.07 -0.01 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.23 1.00 0.07 0.01 0.02
13 ROE -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 0.22 0.10 -0.04 0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.21 0.40 1.00 0.04 0.06
14 Size -0.25 -0.24 -0.25 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.27 0.33 -0.11 0.10 0.24 0.29 1.00 0.35




Panel B: The payment method sample (N = 6,215)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
1 CustomerHHI 1.00 0.51 0.83 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02
2 MajorCustomer 0.97 1.00 0.79 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.13 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02
3 TotalMajorCustomerSales 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03
4 PercentStock -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 0.05 -0.12 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.26 0.11 0.00
5 AbnormalReturn -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 1.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.15 -0.19 0.04 0.03 0.01
6 CompetedBid -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.11 0.03 1.00 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.05
7 Growth 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.13 -0.01 -0.08 1.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
8 GrowthMismatch -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.12 1.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
9 InstitutionalOwnership 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 1.00 -0.01 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.07 0.10 0.03
10 Leverage -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 1.00 -0.16 0.46 0.00 -0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03
11 Liquidity 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.13 0.00 0.20 -0.45 1.00 0.14 -0.04 -0.12 0.07 0.07 -0.09 -0.10
12 MTB -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.31 -0.06 0.25 -0.07 0.12 0.15 0.20 1.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.02
13 PERatio -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.21 1.00 0.07 -0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.00
14 ROE -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.25 0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.13 0.21 0.40 1.00 -0.28 0.00 0.06 0.05
15 ReturnVolatility 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.01 -0.21 -0.07 0.11 -0.03 -0.06 -0.18 0.10 -0.17 -0.33 -0.37 1.00 -0.04 -0.16 -0.10
16 SameIndustry -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.27 0.05 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.04 1.00 0.07 -0.02
17 Size -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 0.11 0.08 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.11 0.34 -0.16 0.10 0.19 0.25 -0.51 0.10 1.00 0.35
18 SwitchingCosts -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.10 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.24 -0.21 0.06 0.15 0.25 -0.25 -0.06 0.58 1.00
This table presents correlations among the variables used in our analyses. Pearson (Spearman) correlations appear above (below) the diagonal. Panel A includes the
variables and sample used for bid probability tests. Panel B includes the variables and sample used for payment method tests.  See the appendix for all variable definitions.
Bold indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3
Customer concentration and bid likelihood








Intercept -2.618 *** -2.553 *** -2.561 ***
-(69.83) -(53.83) -(53.91)
CustomerConcentration -0.104 *** -0.022 *** -0.020 ***
-(3.27) -(3.37) -(3.11)
AbnormalReturn -0.122 *** -0.122 *** -0.122 ***
-(4.82) -(4.82) -(4.82)
ROE -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
-(1.12) -(1.12) -(1.11)
GrowthMismatch 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Growth -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.007 *
-(1.65) -(1.65) -(1.65)
Liquidity 0.077 0.080 0.080
(1.12) (1.17) (1.16)
Leverage 0.060 *** 0.060 *** 0.060 ***
(7.42) (7.42) (7.43)
Size -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
-(4.35) -(4.35) -(4.34)
MTB -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
-(7.60) -(7.60) -(7.60)
PERatio -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
-(2.97) -(2.98) -(2.98)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.047 -0.048 -0.047
-(0.91) -(0.93) -(0.92)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.043 0.043
Observations 108,430 108,430 108,430
This table reports results from Logit regressions relating the probability of receiving a bid to customer concentration measures and controls for
Compustat firms from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is BidIndicator. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects
are defined at the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
39
Table 4
Customer concentration and payment method
Panel A: The full payment method sample








Intercept 25.998 *** 24.061 *** 24.006 ***
(7.70) (7.17) (7.16)
CustomerConcentration 3.246 *** 0.617 *** 0.666 ***
(2.92) (2.73) (2.96)
AbnormalReturn 2.922 *** 2.904 *** 2.913 ***
(2.85) (2.83) (2.84)
ROE -0.596 -0.602 -0.603
-(0.89) -(0.90) -(0.90)
GrowthMismatch -3.860 *** -3.861 *** -3.855 ***
-(3.88) -(3.88) -(3.88)
Growth 0.350 0.346 0.346
(1.64) (1.62) (1.63)
Liquidity 7.744 *** 7.624 *** 7.627 ***
(2.86) (2.82) (2.82)
Leverage -1.305 *** -1.308 *** -1.308 ***
-(4.71) -(4.72) -(4.72)
Size 1.131 *** 1.131 *** 1.132 ***
(8.30) (8.29) (8.30)
MTB 1.080 *** 1.081 *** 1.081 ***
(6.33) (6.33) (6.33)
PERatio 0.012 0.012 0.012
(1.30) (1.30) (1.30)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.739 -0.733 -0.745
-(0.45) -(0.44) -(0.45)
Same Industry 14.014 *** 14.017 *** 14.021 ***
(13.89) (13.89) (13.90)
Return Volatility 21.675 21.676 21.409
(0.87) (0.87) (0.86)
Competed Bid -8.872 *** -8.843 *** -8.845 ***
-(7.23) -(7.20) -(7.20)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.241 0.241
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating the payment method to customer concentration measures and controls for bid offers
from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is Percent Stock. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects are defined at
the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 4, cont.
Customer concentration and payment method
Panel B: The public acquirer sample









CustomerConcentration (γ1) -3.249 -0.594 -0.538
-(1.02) -(0.95) -(0.86)
CustomerConcentration*RelativeSize (γ2) 10.831 ** 2.118 ** 2.188 **
(1.99) (1.98) (2.04)
Acquirer controls
AcquirerSales -0.100 ** -0.099 ** -0.099 **
-(2.34) -(2.32) -(2.32)
AcquirerROA -20.749 *** -20.639 *** -20.673 ***
-(2.96) -(2.93) -(2.95)
AcquirerMTB 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.36) (0.35) (0.36)
RelativeSize 25.834 *** 19.669 *** 19.334 ***
(7.05) (3.29) (3.24)
Target controls
AbnormalReturn 2.229 2.231 2.251
ROE -0.769 -0.759 -0.768
GrowthMismatch -4.893 *** -4.890 *** -4.865 ***
Growth -0.195 -0.197 -0.197
Liquidity 8.338 * 8.237 * 8.161 *
Leverage -1.731 *** -1.727 *** -1.729 ***
Size 0.968 *** 0.969 *** 0.970 ***
MTB 1.164 *** 1.159 *** 1.161 ***
PERatio 0.022 0.022 0.022
InstitutionalOwnership -3.439 -3.429 -3.430
Same Industry 2.153 2.193 2.212
Return Volatility 46.043 46.469 45.651
Competed Bid -13.746 *** -13.742 *** -13.731 ***
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.275 0.275
Observations 2,310 2,310 2,310
Total effect of cust. concentration (γ1 + γ2) 7.582 ** 1.524 ** 1.650 **
t-test of (γ1 + γ2) = 0: (2.13) (2.13) (2.32)
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating the payment method to customer concentration measures and controls for bid offers
from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is Percent Stock. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects are defined at
the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. For brevity,
intercepts and t-stats for target controls have been repressed.
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Table 5
Government and non-government customer concentration
Panel A: Bid likelihood








Intercept -2.618 *** -2.537 *** -2.543 ***
-(69.88) -(33.64) -(33.67)
NonGovt_Concentration (η1) -0.122 *** -0.026 *** -0.025 ***
-(3.68) -(3.91) -(3.76)
Govt_Concentration (η2) -0.003 -0.001 0.000
-(0.05) -(0.06) -(0.03)
AbnormalReturn -0.122 *** -0.122 *** -0.122 ***
-(4.81) -(4.81) -(4.81)
ROE -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
-(1.15) -(1.17) -(1.16)
GrowthMismatch 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.25) (0.24) (0.24)
Growth -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.007 *
-(1.66) -(1.65) -(1.65)
Liquidity 0.084 0.088 0.088
(1.22) (1.28) (1.28)
Leverage 0.059 *** 0.059 *** 0.059 ***
(7.40) (7.38) (7.39)
Size -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
-(4.35) -(4.35) -(4.35)
MTB -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
-(7.58) -(7.57) -(7.57)
PERatio -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
-(2.99) -(3.00) -(3.00)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.049 -0.050 -0.050
-(0.95) -(0.98) -(0.97)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.043 0.043
Observations 108,430 108,430 108,430
Comparison of cust. concentration coefficients (η1 - η2) -0.119 * -0.025 ** -0.025 *
t-test of (η1 - η2) = 0: -(1.90) -(1.99) -(1.95)
This table reports results from Logit regressions relating the probability of receiving a bid to customer concentration measures and controls for
Compustat firms from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is BidIndicator. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects
are defined at the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5, cont.
Government and non-government customer concentration
Panel B: Payment method (using full payment method sample)








Intercept 26.085 *** 23.898 *** 23.835 ***
(7.73) (6.22) (6.20)
NonGovt_Concentration (θ1) 3.816 *** 0.753 *** 0.772 ***
(3.26) (3.31) (3.40)
Govt_Concentration (θ2) -0.048 -0.012 -0.004
-(0.02) -(0.03) -(0.01)
AbnormalReturn 2.889 *** 2.879 *** 2.872 ***
(2.81) (2.80) (2.80)
ROE -0.583 -0.584 -0.584
-(0.87) -(0.87) -(0.87)
GrowthMismatch -3.858 *** -3.855 *** -3.850 ***
-(3.88) -(3.88) -(3.87)
Growth 0.352 * 0.349 0.349
(1.65) (1.64) (1.64)
Liquidity 7.524 *** 7.390 *** 7.373 ***
(2.78) (2.73) (2.72)
Leverage -1.292 *** -1.295 *** -1.294 ***
-(4.68) -(4.69) -(4.68)
Size 1.133 *** 1.134 *** 1.135 ***
(8.27) (8.28) (8.28)
MTB 1.076 *** 1.077 *** 1.077 ***
(6.32) (6.33) (6.33)
PERatio 0.012 0.012 0.012
(1.32) (1.32) (1.31)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.748 -0.770 -0.764
-(0.45) -(0.47) -(0.46)
SameIndustry 13.990 *** 13.994 *** 14.001 ***
(13.87) (13.87) (13.88)
ReturnVolatility 19.472 19.132 18.924
(0.78) (0.77) (0.76)
CompetedBid
-8.872 *** -8.847 *** -8.853 ***
-(7.22) -(7.20) -(7.21)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.241 0.241
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215
Comparison of cust. concentration coefficients (θ1 - θ2) 3.863 0.765 0.776
t-test of (θ1 - θ2) = 0: (1.60) (1.59) (1.61)
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating the payment method to customer concentration measures and controls for bid offers
from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is Percent Stock. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects are defined at
the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5, cont.
Government and non-government customer concentration
Panel C: Payment method (using public acquirer sample)









NonGovt_Concentration (λ1) -3.845 -0.617 -0.565
-(1.15) -(0.97) -(0.90)
NonGovt_Concentration*RelativeSize (λ2) 14.281 ** 2.726 ** 2.629 **
(2.50) (2.51) (2.44)
Govt_Concentration (λ3) 0.670 0.190 0.209
(0.09) (0.13) (0.14)
Govt_Concentration*RelativeSize (λ4) -9.028 -1.849 -1.885
-(0.75) -(0.77) -(0.78)
Acquirer controls
AcquirerSales -0.097 ** -0.097 ** -0.097 **
-(2.30) -(2.28) -(2.28)
AcquirerROA -19.923 *** -19.847 *** -19.817 ***
-(2.84) -(2.81) -(2.81)
AcquirerMTB 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34)
RelativeSize 25.879 *** 25.207 ** 25.799 **
(7.06) (2.02) (2.06)
Target controls
AbnormalReturn 2.303 2.330 2.311
ROE -0.778 -0.784 -0.787
GrowthMismatch -4.866 *** -4.847 *** -4.840 ***
Growth -0.188 -0.190 -0.187
Liquidity 8.105 7.929 * 7.880 *
Leverage -1.647 *** -1.646 *** -1.647 ***
Size 0.968 *** 0.969 *** 0.968 ***
MTB 1.131 *** 1.127 *** 1.129 ***
PERatio 0.021 0.021 0.021
InstitutionalOwnership -3.703 -3.721 -3.698
Same Industry 2.227 2.274 2.288
ReturnVolatility 41.308 40.404 40.259
Competed Bid -13.545 *** -13.497 *** -13.509 ***
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.277 0.277
Observations 2,310 2,310 2,310
Comparison of total effects of non-government and
government concentration (λ1 + λ2) – (λ3 + λ4) 18.794 ** 3.768 ** 3.740 **
t-test of [(λ1 + λ2) – (λ3 + λ4)] = 0: (2.40) (2.42) (2.40)
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating the payment method to customer concentration measures and controls for bid offers
from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is Percent Stock. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects are defined at
the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. For brevity,
intercepts and t-stats for target controls have been repressed.
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Table 6
Customer concentration and switching costs
Panel A: Bid likelihood








Intercept -2.864 *** -2.672 *** -2.687 ***
-(50.72) -(36.37) -(36.46)
CustomerConcentration (ν1) -0.323 *** -0.067 *** -0.064 ***
-(6.35) -(6.46) -(6.16)
SwitchingCosts (ν2) 0.351 *** -0.005 0.010
(4.31) -(0.04) (0.08)
CustomerConcentration * SwitchingCosts (ν3) 0.547 *** 0.119 *** 0.116 ***
(5.94) (6.24) (6.08)
AbnormalReturn -0.129 *** -0.130 *** -0.130 ***
-(4.97) -(4.98) -(4.97)
ROE -0.045 ** -0.045 ** -0.045 **
-(2.45) -(2.44) -(2.43)
GrowthMismatch 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.50) (0.50) (0.51)
Growth -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
-(1.59) -(1.58) -(1.58)
Liquidity 0.205 *** 0.212 *** 0.211 ***
(2.86) (2.96) (2.96)
Leverage 0.054 *** 0.054 *** 0.054 ***
(6.70) (6.68) (6.70)
Size -0.020 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 ***
-(4.20) -(4.20) -(4.20)
MTB -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
-(7.48) -(7.45) -(7.46)
PERatio -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
-(3.37) -(3.40) -(3.40)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.174 *** -0.176 *** -0.176 ***
-(3.25) -(3.27) -(3.27)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.046 0.046
Observations 108,430 108,430 108,430
Total effect of customer concentration (ν1 + ν3) 0.224 *** 0.053 *** 0.053 ***
t-test of (ν1 + ν3) = 0: (3.68) (4.08) (4.08)
This table reports results from Logit regressions relating the probability of receiving a bid to customer concentration measures and controls for
Compustat firms from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is BidIndicator. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects
are defined at the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 6, cont.
Customer concentration and switching costs
Panel B: Payment method (using full payment method sample)








Intercept 22.485 *** 19.938 *** 19.890 ***
(6.51) (5.39) (5.38)
CustomerConcentration (δ1) 5.720 *** 0.905 ** 0.950 **
(2.80) (2.22) (2.34)
SwitchingCosts (δ2) 12.193 *** 12.899 *** 12.888 ***
(4.11) (2.94) (2.93)
CustomerConcentration * SwitchingCosts (δ3) -4.784 -0.508 -0.502
-(1.31) -(0.68) -(0.68)
AbnormalReturn 3.062 *** 3.056 *** 3.067 ***
(2.97) (2.97) (2.98)
ROE -0.785 -0.806 -0.808
-(1.16) -(1.19) -(1.19)
GrowthMismatch -3.677 *** -3.674 *** -3.666 ***
-(3.70) -(3.70) -(3.69)
Growth 0.324 0.321 0.321
(1.55) (1.54) (1.54)
Liquidity 10.241 *** 10.152 *** 10.161 ***
(3.66) (3.63) (3.63)
Leverage -1.354 *** -1.363 *** -1.363 ***
-(4.89) -(4.92) -(4.92)
Size 0.913 *** 0.921 *** 0.923 ***
(6.73) (6.78) (6.79)
MTB 1.074 *** 1.077 *** 1.077 ***
(6.34) (6.35) (6.35)
PERatio 0.011 0.011 0.011
(1.24) (1.25) (1.25)
InstitutionalOwnership -1.695 -1.675 -1.687
-(1.02) -(1.01) -(1.01)
SameIndustry 13.962 *** 13.963 *** 13.968 ***
(13.83) (13.83) (13.84)
ReturnVolatility 52.413 ** 52.988 ** 52.811 **
(1.99) (2.01) (2.00)
CompetedBid
-9.343 *** -9.323 *** -9.329 ***
-(7.63) -(7.60) -(7.61)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.242 0.243
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215
Total effect of customer concentration (δ1 + δ3) 0.936 0.398 0.448
t-test of (δ1 + δ3) = 0: (0.42) (0.86) (0.97)
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating the payment method to customer concentration measures and controls for bid offers
from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is Percent Stock. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects are defined at
the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 6, cont.
Customer concentration and switching costs
Panel C: Payment method (using public acquirer sample)








Intercept 24.301 *** 26.447 *** 27.147 ***
(4.31) (3.77) (3.89)
CustomerConcentration (τ1) -4.444 -0.787 -0.862
-(0.83) -(0.76) -(0.84)
RelativeSize (τ2) 27.454 *** 15.157 13.996
(4.30) (1.41) (1.32)
SwitchingCosts (τ3) 9.114 7.573 5.793
(1.11) (0.60) (0.46)
CustomerConcentration*RelativeSize (τ4) 22.286 ** 4.255 ** 4.483 **
(2.25) (2.23) (2.38)
CustomerConcentration*SwitchingCosts (τ5) 3.142 0.536 0.904
(0.28) (0.25) (0.42)
RelativeSize*SwitchingCosts (τ6) -6.681 6.993 9.224
-(0.55) (0.34) (0.45)
CustomerConcentration*SwitchingCosts*RelativeSize (τ7) -24.285 -4.671 -5.119
-(1.26) -(1.25) -(1.38)
Controls included Y Y Y
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.276 0.276 0.276
Observations 2,310 2,310 2,310
Total effect of CustomerConcentration when:
(1) RelativeSize = 1, SwitchingCosts = 0 17.842 *** 3.468 *** 3.622 ***
t-test of (τ1 + τ 4) = 0: (2.62) (2.60) (2.75)
(2) RelativeSize = 1, SwitchingCosts = 1 -3.301 -0.667 -0.594
t-test of (τ1 + τ 4 + τ 5 + τ 7) = 0: -(0.46) -(0.47) -(0.42)
Difference [(2) – (1)] -21.143 * -4.135 * -4.215 *
t-test of [(τ 5 + τ 7)] = 0: -(1.78) -(1.77) -(1.81)
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating the payment method to customer concentration measures and controls for bid offers
from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is Percent Stock. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects are defined at
the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. For brevity,
controls have been repressed.
47
Table 7
Customer concentration and relationship age
Panel A: Bid likelihood








Intercept -2.652 *** -2.667 *** -2.666 ***
-(71.58) -(40.43) -(40.42)
CustomerConcentration_Long (ρ1) 0.080 * 0.016 * 0.016 *
(1.83) (1.83) (1.82)
CustomerConcentration_Short (ρ2)
-0.087 ** -0.016 ** -0.017 **
-(2.50) -(2.51) -(2.57)
AbnormalReturn -0.121 *** -0.121 *** -0.121 ***
-(4.80) -(4.80) -(4.80)
ROE -0.019 -0.019 -0.020
-(1.07) -(1.07) -(1.07)
GrowthMismatch 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Growth -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
-(1.63) -(1.63) -(1.63)
Liquidity 0.077 0.078 0.078
(1.12) (1.13) (1.13)
Leverage 0.060 *** 0.060 *** 0.060 ***
(7.45) (7.45) (7.45)
Size -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
-(4.32) -(4.32) -(4.32)
MTB -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
-(7.62) -(7.62) -(7.62)
PERatio -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
-(2.96) -(2.96) -(2.96)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.044 -0.045 -0.045
-(0.86) -(0.87) -(0.87)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.043 0.043
Observations 108,430 108,430 108,430
Comparison of cust. concentration coefficients (ρ1 - ρ2) 0.167 *** 0.033 *** 0.033 ***
t-test of (ρ1 - ρ2) = 0: (3.52) (3.46) (3.49)
This table reports results from Logit regressions relating the probability of receiving a bid to customer concentration measures and controls for
Compustat firms from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is BidIndicator. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects
are defined at the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 7, cont.
Customer concentration and relationship age
Panel B: Payment method (using the full payment method sample)








Intercept 24.648 *** 21.440 *** 21.439 ***
(7.34) (5.64) (5.64)
CustomerConcentration_Long (μ 1) 1.332 0.284 0.283
(0.86) (0.90) (0.90)
CustomerConcentration_Short (μ 2) 3.695 *** 0.687 *** 0.686 ***
(2.85) (2.83) (2.83)
AbnormalReturn 2.874 *** 2.872 *** 2.871 ***
(2.80) (2.80) (2.80)
ROE -0.573 -0.574 -0.575
-(0.85) -(0.85) -(0.85)
GrowthMismatch -3.903 *** -3.894 *** -3.897 ***
-(3.93) -(3.92) -(3.92)
Growth 0.351 0.349 0.349
(1.63) (1.63) (1.63)
Liquidity 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(2.83) (2.81) (2.81)
Leverage -1.314 *** -1.316 *** -1.316 ***
-(4.73) -(4.74) -(4.74)
Size 1.132 *** 1.132 *** 1.132 ***
(8.34) (8.33) (8.33)
MTB 1.085 *** 1.086 *** 1.086 ***
(6.32) (6.33) (6.33)
PERatio 0.012 0.011 0.011
(1.29) (1.28) (1.28)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.698 -0.686 -0.689
-(0.42) -(0.42) -(0.42)
Same Industry 13.930 *** 13.931 *** 13.932 ***
(13.80) (13.80) (13.80)
Return Volatility 22.916 22.816 22.816
(0.92) (0.92) (0.92)
Competed Bid -8.889 *** -8.874 *** -8.871 ***
-(7.23) -(7.21) -(7.21)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.241 0.241
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215
Comparison of cust. concentration coefficients (μ 1 - μ 2) -2.364 -0.403 -0.403
t-test of (μ 1 - μ 2) = 0: -(1.36) -(1.17) -(1.17)
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating the payment method to customer concentration measures and controls for bid offers
from 1985-2016.The dependent variable is Percent Stock. See the appendix for all variable definitions. Industry fixed effects are defined at the
Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 8
Instrumental variable analysis - Bid likelihood
Panel A: First stage








Intercept 0.322 *** 2.862 *** 2.822 ***
(13.27) (23.22) (22.97)
Industry Concentration t-2 0.395 *** 0.465 *** 0.476 ***
(27.05) (29.14) (29.92)
Industry Concentration t-3 0.095 *** 0.053 *** 0.044 ***
(6.43) (3.96) (3.26)
AbnormalReturn 0.001 0.005 0.007
(0.44) (0.45) (0.58)
ROE -0.018 *** -0.094 *** -0.093 ***
-(10.90) -(11.84) -(11.76)
GrowthMismatch -0.009 *** -0.045 *** -0.041 ***
-(3.09) -(3.39) -(3.08)
Growth -0.0001 * -0.0003 -0.0003
-(1.65) -(1.46) -(1.44)
Liquidity 0.047 *** 0.390 *** 0.396 ***
(6.98) (11.97) (12.18)
Leverage -0.004 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 ***
-(4.72) -(5.37) -(5.25)
Size -0.001 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 ***
-(18.68) -(19.07) -(19.20)
MTB -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001
-(1.14) -(0.68) -(0.82)
PERatio 0.000 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
-(3.42) -(4.55) -(4.57)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.038 *** -0.237 *** -0.226 ***
-(8.44) -(11.09) -(10.58)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Observations 107,727 107,727 107,727
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.248 0.252
Tests of endogeneity, weak instruments, and overidentification:
Endogeneity Test (Pr > Chi-Sq) 0.013 ** 0.004 *** 0.005 ***
F-Statistic 1883.720 *** 2243.360 *** 2267.282 ***
Partial-R2 0.027 0.031 0.032
Sargan-Hansen Test (Pr > Chi-Sq) 0.231 0.563 0.441
This table reports results from first-stage OLS regressions instrumenting for customer concentration variables using lagged industry customer
concentration. The dependent variables are MajorCustomer, CustomerHHI, and TotalMajorCustomerSales. Industry concentration is
measured in year t-2 and t-3 as the average customer concentration within the target SIC 3-digit industry level (excluding the target
concentration from the calculation). Industry fixed effects are defined at the Fama-French 48 level. See the appendix for all variable
definitions. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the
firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 8, cont.
Instrumental variable analysis - Bid likelihood
Panel B: Second stage








Intercept -2.172 *** -1.830 *** -1.857 ***
-(8.90) -(6.85) -(5.71)
Predicted CustomerConcentration -0.523 *** -0.114 *** -0.110 ***
-(3.94) -(4.46) -(3.73)
AbnormalReturn -0.121 *** -0.121 *** -0.121 ***
-(4.95) -(5.07) -(5.32)
ROE -0.029 * -0.030 * -0.030 *
-(1.91) -(1.80) -(1.74)
GrowthMismatch 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Growth -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
-(1.58) -(1.47) -(1.43)
Liquidity 0.102 * 0.121 ** 0.121 *
(1.79) (2.08) (1.84)
Leverage 0.057 *** 0.057 *** 0.057 ***
(7.45) (7.15) (8.64)
Size -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
-(6.85) -(7.54) -(6.48)
MTB -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
-(8.92) -(7.70) -(8.43)
PERatio -0.0008 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0008 ***
-(3.55) -(3.84) -(3.87)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.063 -0.071 -0.069
-(1.52) -(1.63) -(1.63)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.033 0.033
Observations 107,727 107,727 107,727
This table reports results from second-stage Logit regressions relating the probability of receiving a bid to predicted customer concentration
measures and controls for Compustat firms from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is BidIndicator, and MajorCustomer, CustomerHHI, and
TotalMajorCustomerSales are the fitted values obtained in the first stage. See the appendix for all variable definitions.). Industry fixed effects
are defined at the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on
bootstrapped standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 9
Instrumental variable analysis – Payment method
Panel A: First stage








Intercept -0.006 0.578 0.495
-(0.05) (0.86) (0.76)
Industry Concentration t-2 0.644 *** 0.716 *** 0.715 ***
(10.41) (10.84) (11.03)
Industry Concentration t-3 0.133 ** 0.087 0.090
(2.17) (1.31) (1.39)
AbnormalReturn -0.029 ** -0.121 ** -0.124 **
-(2.47) -(2.05) -(2.08)
ROE 0.007 0.045 0.043
(0.88) (1.19) (1.13)
GrowthMismatch -0.012 -0.065 -0.067
-(1.00) -(1.07) -(1.11)
Growth -0.004 * -0.014 -0.013
-(1.66) -(1.08) -(1.03)
Liquidity -0.012 0.134 0.118
-(0.34) (0.76) (0.68)
Leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-(0.27) -(0.08) -(0.08)
Size -0.004 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 ***
-(2.71) -(3.03) -(3.01)
MTB 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
-(0.09) -(0.16) -(0.13)
PERatio 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
InstitutionalOwnership 0.030 0.142 0.150
(1.39) (1.31) (1.37)
Same Industry -0.005 -0.031 -0.033
-(0.43) -(0.53) -(0.56)
Return Volatility 0.915 *** 4.895 *** 4.900 ***
(3.13) (3.37) (3.40)
Competed Bid -0.025 -0.167 * -0.152
-(1.20) -(1.70) -(1.52)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215
Adjusted R2 0.271 0.287 0.289
Tests of endogeneity, weak instruments, and overidentification:
Endogeneity Test (Pr > Chi-Sq) 0.166 0.200 0.216
F Statistic 246.151 *** 273.59 *** 274.849 ***
Partial-R2 0.058 0.063 0.064
Sargan-Hansen Test (Pr > Chi-Sq) 0.705 0.560 0.404
This table reports results from first-stage OLS regressions instrumenting for customer concentration variables using lagged industry customer
concentration. The dependent variables are MajorCustomer, CustomerHHI, and TotalMajorCustomerSales. Industry concentration is
measured in year t-2 and t-3 as the average customer concentration within the target SIC 3-digit industry level (excluding the target
concentration from the calculation). Industry fixed effects are defined at the Fama-French 48 level. See the appendix for all variable
definitions. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the
firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 9, cont.
Instrumental variable analysis – Payment method
Panel B: Second stage








Intercept -34.947 *** -34.812 *** -34.893 ***
-(3.76) -(3.73) -(3.77)
Predicted Customer Concentration 1.541 ** 1.513 ** 1.555 **
(2.04) (2.00) (2.06)
AbnormalReturn 3.043 *** 2.898 *** 3.049 ***
(2.96) (2.82) (2.96)
ROE -0.642 -0.492 -0.640
-(0.95) -(0.72) -(0.95)
GrowthMismatch -3.782 *** -3.502 *** -3.777 ***
-(3.82) -(3.53) -(3.81)
Growth 0.353 * 0.449 *** 0.352 *
(1.69) (3.24) (1.69)
Liquidity 7.442 *** 8.272 *** 7.468 ***
(2.77) (3.05) (2.78)
Leverage -1.303 *** -1.266 *** -1.304 ***
-(4.72) -(4.59) -(4.72)
Size 1.156 *** 1.158 *** 1.157 ***
(8.40) (8.41) (8.40)
MTB 1.080 *** 1.056 *** 1.080 ***
(6.35) (6.20) (6.35)
PERatio 0.012 0.012 0.012
(1.31) (1.33) (1.31)
InstitutionalOwnership -0.882 -0.986 -0.893
-(0.54) -(0.60) -(0.54)
Same Industry 14.089 *** 14.143 *** 14.092 ***
(14.03) (14.09) (14.03)
Return Volatility 15.440 17.999 15.489
(0.61) (0.71) (0.61)
Competed Bid -8.655 *** -8.743 *** -8.680 ***
-(7.05) -(7.11) -(7.08)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.238 0.237 0.239
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215
This table reports results from second-stage OLS regressions relating the payment method to predicted customer concentration measures and
controls for bid offers from 1985-2016. The dependent variable is Percent Stock, and MajorCustomer, CustomerHHI, and
TotalMajorCustomerSales are the fitted values obtained in the first stage. See the appendix for all variable definitions Industry fixed effects
are defined at the Fama-French 48 level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
